RDRAND and RDSEED are both using quantum principles (aka: heat and temperature / truly quantumly random noise at the microscopic level in the CPU's transistors) to generate random numbers.
Well... a seed at least. And then they are expanded using AES encryption IIRC (which "shouldn't" be breakable, and even if it were breakable it'd probably be very difficult to follow). I think RDSEED takes hundreds (or nearly a thousand) cycles to complete, but we're still talking millions-of-bits of entropy per second. More than enough to shuffle a deck even if you're taking a fresh RDSEED every single card.
Every few months, it feels like "someone effed up RNG" becomes an article. But in practice, RDRAND / RDSEED are the primitives you need. And you should be getting that for free with Linux's /dev/urandom on modern platforms.
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I think RDSEED / RDRAND cannot be "proven secure" because of all the VMs we are running in practice though. So its something you need to be running on physical hardware to be 100% sure of security. So its still harder than it looks.
But its not "impossible" or anything. Just work to cover all the little issues that could go wrong. After all, these RDRAND/RDSEED instructions were created so that we can send our credit card numbers securely across the internet. They're solid because they _HAVE_ to be solid. And if anyone figures out a problem with these instructions, virtually everyone in the cryptographic community will be notified of it immediately.
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EDIT: I should probably add that using the shot-noise found in a pn-junction (be it a diode or npn transistor) is a fun student-level EE project if anyone wants to actually play with the principles here.
You are basically applying an amplifier of some kind (be it 3x inverters, or an OpAmp, or another NPN transistor) to a known quantum-source of noise. Reverse-avalanche noise from a Zener Diode is often chosen but there's many, many sources of true white-noise that you could amplify.
When you can modify the microcode of a CPU, you can modify the behaviour of the RDRAND/RDSEED instructions. For example, using EntrySign [1] on AMD, you can make RDRAND to always return 4 (chosen by a fair dice roll, guaranteed to be random)
I don't mean to say that RDSEED is sufficient for security. But a "correctly implemented and properly secured" RDSEED is indeed, quantum random.
IE: While not "all" RDSEED implementations (ie: microcode vulnerabilities, virtual machine emulation, etc. etc.) are correct... it is possible to build a true RNG for cryptographic-level security with "correct" RDSEED implementations.
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This is an important factoid because a lot of people still think you need geiger counters and/or crazy radio antenna to find sufficient sources of true entropy. Nope!! The easiest source of true quantum entropy is heat, and that's inside of every chip. A good implementation can tap into that heat and provide perfect randomness.
Just yeah: microcode vulnerabilities, VM vulnerabilities, etc. etc. There's a whole line of other stuff you also need to keep secure. But those are "Tractable" problems and within the skills of a typical IT Team / Programming team. The overall correct strategy is that... I guess "pn-junction shot noise" is a sufficient source of randomness. And that exists in every single transistor of your ~billion transistor chips/CPUs. You do need to build out the correct amplifiers to see this noise but that's called RDSEED in practice.
What I’m impressed by is getting noise of a consistent level out of a circuit. That’s a nice second layer of difficulty to the “make some noise” EE project.
Its easy to think if you can see it in both frequency and time domains.
So the fourier-transform of white noise is still.... white noise. Random is random as you say. But this has implications. That means the "wattage" of noise (ie: Voltage * Current == Watts aka its power) is a somewhat predictable value. If you have 0.5 Watts of noise, it will be 0.5 Watts of noise in the frequency-domain (after a fourier transform, across all frequencies).
The hard part of amplification is keeping it consistent across all specifications. I assume the previous post was talking about keeping white noise (which is "flat" across all frequency domains), truly flat. IE: It means your OpAmps (or whatever other amplifer you use) CANNOT distort the value.
Which is still student level (you cannot be a good EE / Analog engineer if you're carelessly introducing distortions). Any distortion of white-noise is easily seen because your noise profile weakens over frequency (or strengthens over frequency), rather than being consistent.
Alternatively, you can choose a proven source of white noise.
Such as the reverse-bias shot and/or avalanche noise at the pn junction of a reverse bias'ed Zener Diode. Which is white-noise into the hundreds-of-MHz. Maybe not good enough for RDSEED, but certainly good enough and fast-enough for most hobbyist projects who are experimenting with this for the first time.
One thing that I wonder about is that even with Fisher-Yates, a PRNG relies on a seed value. Assuming that this seed is going to be a 64-bit value, that seed value can only go up to a maximum of 2^64-1 = 18,446,744,073,709,551,615.000, which is still less than 52!.
I know that modern operating systems use an entropy pool. Does this mean that the PRNG is re-seeded for every random number generated, thus making this a non-issue? Or does it just take from this entropy pool once?
When I did it back in the day for a poker site we also had the constraint of never storing the positions of shuffled cards for security reasons. We always sorted the deck and when it came to dealing I developed a shuffle server that got noise from a taped up webcams cmos sensor, when a player needed a card it polled the server which was just outputting random positions from 0 to 51 continuously, if the card position was already dealt, it re requested a new one, entropy was gotten from player decision time and network speed. It was a fun thing to build.
Online poker died because having 1 other person at the table sharing cards surreptitiously drastically increases the odds in your favor, which ruins cash games. Let alone AI which has mostly solved the game if you have a bot making your decisions.
Poker must be played in person, otherwise it’s a dead game
None of this is wrong, but anecdotally, I will say that there are still human beings playing poker online, and a better human being can still win in the long run. (Though, live poker is much more fun)
> Today many online poker sites use the Fisher–Yates algorithm, also called the Knuth shuffle (which sounds delightfully like a dance). It’s easy to implement and delivers satisfactory results.
Assuming CSPRNG and fisher yates, why is it only "satisfactory"...? What's better...?
We live in a euphemistic world where "satisfactory" is presented to failures to not hurt their feelings, but the word also and originally means it's good enough, i.e. delivers an unbiased shuffle.
But it's not just good enough, it's optimal. It is equivalent to picking a random deck from the set of all possible decks assuming your random source is good. More random than a real shuffle.
Just "cut" in a random location (rotate the deck a random amount), then split the deck roughly in half (add a bit of random variation), then "flip them together" back to front by alternately taking 1 or 2 (randomly, add a small chance of 3, so maybe 50% 1, 40% 2 and 10% 3) from each side till there are no cards left to shuffle. Then repeat 8 times or so (there's a certain minimum number of times that ensures good randomness)
(a) Use Fischer-Yates, which is fast and, if correctly implemented, unbiased, or
(b) Come up with an ad-hoc scheme like this, do some fancy math to bound its total variation distance (or, worse, some weaker concept of distance), convince yourself that the distance to the uniform distribution is acceptable, and end up with a slower algorithm when you’re done.
The artice links to the paper which discusses the issue. The paper identifies two problems: a biased swapping algorithm, and a PRNG with easy-to-guess state.
For the first problem, a very simple "for each card, pick a number between 1 and 52 and swap the card with that number (or do nothing if it's the same card)" is proposed to eliminate bias. This seems pretty simple to verify.
For the second problem, there is no workaround except to use a better RNG.
So in the context of the paper, the reason your algorithm wouldn't have worked is because the programmers seeded their PRNG with the time of day. In the context of shuffling more generally, I don't know but it seems that there are even simpler algorithms.
If you are asking why your proposed shuffling method is insecure: I don't know, and that's why I would never use that.
Asking "why not do X?" is entirely not paranoid enough for security. If you want to propose an algorithm, start with trying to prove the security claims of the algorithm. In this case, you'd need to prove that your algorithm creates a permutation that is indistinguishable from random. If you can't prove it, it's highly probable that your algorithm doesn't create a random permutation and someone will figure out how to break it.
I'll point out that we already have proven shuffling algorithms[1] and they're obviously faster than what you've proposed. So the simple answer to your question is "Because it's unproven and slower than proven algorithms."
From what I understand, the quality of the randomness of Fisher-Yates depends entirely on the quality of the random source AND that you didn't bias it by using modulo with a non-evenly-dividing divisor. It actually says that right in the article.
My method may not suffer as much from those drawbacks, but you're right, without testing it thoroughly, there's no way to know and it should not be relied upon instead of F-Y.
Turns out that an even easier way is just to assign 128 bits of randomness to each card and sort them by that. Degrades gracefully from biased sources, apparently.
You could use something like 12 bits of randomness per card (a very rough approximation of the log_2(n^2)) to get the probability that you reuse a number down to a manageable level, check if you’ve reused a number (which is basically free once you’ve sorted), and then repeat the whole process if you reused a number.
Or you could have a lazily calculated infinite precision random number per card and use more like 6 bits per card on expectation. Other than using more (and annoyingly variable) memory, this may well be faster than a properly unbiased Fisher-Yates.
Or you could assign a few bits per card, sort, and then recurse on each group of cards that sorted into the same bucket.
In summary, there are lots of genuinely unbiased solutions (assuming a perfect binary RNG), and they all boil down to something roughly equivalent to rejection sampling.
With all due respect, I don't think you understand. The 128 bits are just to sort the 52 cards into a random-enough order, and they have sufficient entropy and space for that.
We're not interested in sorting all possible decks, just all possible cards (52) into 1 unique randomized deck. The more bits we assign to these, the more any error or bias in the source goes to nil. (In contrast, consider the use of only 4 bits.)
Since everyone's bashing my use of ChatGPT, I don't think ChatGPT5 would have made that categorical error.
2^128*52 is 6656 bits, or 30x more than 2^226, so it will work IF those bits are independent. If CSPRNG is used, such as AES128, it will use 2^128 seed, which is not enough to cover all 2^226 permutations. If PRNG sequence is reused to generate more shuffles, then the next shuffle can be predicted from the previous one.
CSPRNG AES256 with 2^256 random seed is safe.
CSPRNG AES128 with 2^128 (or less) random seed is not safe.
> If PRNG sequence is reused to generate more shuffles, then the next shuffle can be predicted from the previous one.
That's theoretically true by a counting argument, but for a CSPRNG the only way to compute that next shuffle costs about as much computationally as brute force. 128 bits is enough to make that infeasible, though 256 may be preferable for the usual abundance of caution.
The number of permutations doesn't matter here, since an attack becomes computationally infeasible before it becomes counting infeasible. It's also possible for a practical attack to exist even when the output can't be predicted exactly, since statistical information is still valuable.
> From what I understand, the quality of the randomness of Fisher-Yates depends entirely on the quality of the random source AND that you didn't bias it by using modulo with a non-evenly-dividing divisor. It actually says that right in the article.
Yes.
Pretty much every modern language ships with a secure PRNG (which probably just calls /dev/urandom). A poker site probably has enough throughput to want to not block while waiting for /dev/urandom to build up entropy, so they might do something faster, but /dev/urandom is probably secure, it just might be a slower than a big poker site needs.
The non-evenly-diving divisor thing is a bit trickier, which is why standard libraries implement Fisher-Yates for you. But the solution is basically:
Using your PRNG, generate the number of bits you need. So if you need a number 0-51, generate 6 bits. 6 bits can hold 0-63. If you get a number in the range 52-63, discard that and generate a new 6-bit number with the PRNG.
If you need a number in an awkward range like 0-35, you'll need to discard a lot of numbers, but keep in mind this may still be faster than modular division which is pretty dang slow.
> My method may not suffer as much from those drawbacks, but you're right, without testing it thoroughly, there's no way to know and it should not be relied upon instead of F-Y.
That's very much not what I said.
"Testing it thoroughly" is not adequate. Start by proving the algorithm is correct. If you don't have a proof the algorithm works there's no reason to even start implementing it so there's nothing to test.
And if you believe nothing ChatGPT says then you simply suffer from the opposite bias. The dilemma is that it is mostly right, most of the time, isn't it? Almost like... people? I mean, one person responded with an error that ChatGPT almost certainly wouldn't have made: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45158430
If ChatGPT says things that are empirically provable, then it's not wrong, is it?
"Mostly right" is the most insidious option, because the frequent true statements or implications will lull you into believing the infrequent false ones.
For Fisher-Yates, if the RNG is good then the output permutation is independent of the input permutation. That's not true for your proposed algorithm, and neither you nor the the LLM has analyzed to determine how quickly the sensitivity to the input permutation decays. That sensitivity will have complicated structure, so it's a nontrivial problem in cryptanalysis.
The problem where the low bits of old, not cryptographically secure PRNGs were particularly non-random is real. That would be a problem for any algorithm using it though--imagine if your riffle took rand() % 2. The resolution (use the high bits, not the low bits) is the same for any algorithm. It's possible that your proposed algorithm is less sensitive because the much greater number of RNG calls makes it somehow average out, but neither you nor the LLM has analyzed that, because the residual structure is again a cryptanalysis problem.
Any potentially adversarial application should use a CSPRNG, moving the cryptographic security into that existing, well-studied block. So the problem you're trying to solve doesn't exist in practice. The LLM can probably be prompted to tell you that; but since you stated that the new shuffling algorithm was your idea, it worked to find reasons it was a good one. I don't think this is a good use of LLMs, but if you're going to then you have to avoid any suggestion that the new idea is yours, to avoid triggering the sycophancy.
I never claimed conclusivity; words like "apparently" were supposed to suggest that, which is why I didn't use "obviously," "definitely" or "conclusively".
Also, maybe be less of an asshole next time. People are allowed to be wrong, that is the whole point of a discussion, and ridicule is not a counterargument.
I don't think you're either wrong or right (in fact my intuition sides with yours I think) because I definitely know way less than you about the subject in general, or probably also less than almost anyone here on HN-- just the trust of swaths of people in the authoritativeness of LLM outputs does generally amuse me. I'm sure we'll get there one day, but we're not there yet. I clearly offended you, and I apologize.
“In an ideal world, an algorithm would randomly select an arrangement from the 52! possible decks. But no computer has enough memory to evaluate all of these possibilities, and a perfect random number generator doesn’t yet exist. Therefore, developers generally rely on algorithms that simulate card shuffling.”
You’ve got to be kidding me. What’s wrong with sampling each card independently and uniformly (without replacement)?
> In the late 1990s the development platform ASF Software supplied several online poker providers, such as Planet Poker, with card-shuffling algorithms. The platform even posted the algorithm on its website as proof that the game was reliably programmed.
What amazes me is the level of overconfidence the developers of the broken algorithm had to post it online. I mean it's not that the probability theory was a novel and unexplored field at the time.
Imagine you proudly present to the public your obviously flawed version of the algorithm even though the correct version is known for decades. If only you've read a single book on the topic.
If that's not overconfidence then it's hard to find what is.
You haven't established their intent for gross negligence and give no charity to the fact this was 30 years ago (pre-Wikipedia and the search breadth we have today). Since then, people have continued to expose severe RNG design flaws in other systems designed by very smart people. It happens...
30 years ago it wasn't dark ages. Wikipedia didn't exist but books on probability theory and statistics did.
When you do a shuffling algorithm in a sensitive context (money or security), you have prove that it returns all the possible permutations with equal probability plus put lower bounds on the amount of entropy you need from the underlying RNG. If you're unable to prove it, you shouldn't move forward with the algorithm. Any irregularities in the output distribution can be exploited. This is textbook knowledge pioneered in early encryption works and perfected by the time WWII ended. Evidently the effort to prove correctness was never made.
Now the original article can indeed misrepresent or omit important facts. I'm definitely open to reconsider my conclusion if more facts become available. However "there was no Wikipedia" isn't one of them, it doesn't count as an excuse not to do your job properly.
If it turned out, for example, that "ASF Software" wasn't even aware that their shuffling algorithm was used to shuffle cards and just shipped it along with 200 other basic algorithms as a some sort of "better standard library", this would change the situation. However from the quick googling it seems that their product wasn't a standard library, it was specifically software for Texas Hold'em. This is a "you had one job" kind of situation.
> Since then, people have continued to expose severe RNG design flaws in other systems designed by very smart people. It happens...
Absolutely, but we're not talking frontiers of Computer Science here.
* If you seed your RNG with at most 86 million unique values, you get at most 86 million unique random sequences out of it.
* If your code should have M possible equiprobable outcomes, it has N equiprobable outcomes, and N doesn't divide M, you're in trouble.
I didn't say or imply books didn't exist. You can't credibly say it was as readily available, and I promise you that people are still making these mistakes, today.
> When you do a shuffling algorithm in a sensitive context (money or security), you have prove that it returns all the possible...If you're unable to prove it, you shouldn't move forward with the algorithm.
Ideally, of course! This is a really high standard that I'm afraid isn't enforced in a lot of commercial or even sensitive applications. 86 million permutations is probably good enough and even if someone was clever enough to synch clocks and narrow to 200k permutations, then I'm not convinced there was actually any harm.
Do you have any proof of harm?
And there are plenty of smart people in the 90s and beyond not realizing that relying a system clock to seed values is attackable. These guys, to their credit, patched their system by openly providing their algorithms.
Even if their clients had been harmed, they'd published the algorithm so that their "sophisticated" clients could audit the algorithm.
> I'm definitely open to reconsider my conclusion if more facts become available.
This is circular as you're taking the article's narrative at face value without getting any primary sources confirming gross negligence or "arrogance" as you imply.
...They posted their algorithm as a way to prove it was reliable. Someone pointed out it wasn't reliable. They revised the algorithm. What's the problem here?
They were selling this algorithm for money and evidently didn't use any of that money to hire a single statistician to validate it. The mistake they've made isn't obscure and doesn't require a thousand pairs of eyes to catch, just one.
Imagine paying to a professional plumber, he installs the toilet upside down and then posts the photos online for the community to check his work.
I guess this PRNG has recurrence period much less than 52! (or wasn't seeded appropriately), so that only sampled a fraction of the distribution
"... the system ties its number generation to the number of seconds that have passed since midnight, resetting once each day, which further limits the possible random values. Only about 86 million arrangements could be generated this way,"
This became a hot discussion issue in magic the gathering online (MTGO). I always felt my shuffles in MTGO felt different somehow than my offline paper shuffles. It's hard to know for sure when its all closed source. I know a lot of people were suspicious though.
Closed source doesn't need to stop you - even if a server was dealing out the cards you can still do a randomness test on them once you gather enough deals, but you would probably need millions of hands of data to do the analysis (see: dieharder tests)
Article goes through a mostly irrelevant discussion about "52 factorial is a really really big number" before getting to the computer science meat of the headline:
RNG was seeded with a millisecond time of day, leading to 86.4M possible decks. Oooph.
The number 52! is absurdly large. While the article is behind a paywall and so I can't see its full discussion, I'm reminded of https://czep.net/weblog/52cards.html that has a bit on the "how large is the number"
> Start by picking your favorite spot on the equator. You're going to walk around the world along the equator, but take a very leisurely pace of one step every billion years. The equatorial circumference of the Earth is 40,075,017 meters. Make sure to pack a deck of playing cards, so you can get in a few trillion hands of solitaire between steps. After you complete your round the world trip, remove one drop of water from the Pacific Ocean. Now do the same thing again: walk around the world at one billion years per step, removing one drop of water from the Pacific Ocean each time you circle the globe. The Pacific Ocean contains 707.6 million cubic kilometers of water. Continue until the ocean is empty.
And it goes on.
Numbers like Tree(3) or Loader's number or the various "these are really big mathematical functions" ( relevant xkcd https://xkcd.com/207/ )... we know we can't comprehend them. But 52! - that's something that we think we can get our head around... and it's mind boggling large once you start doing the math and trying to relate it to real things that we can relate to (which are mind bogglingly large).
52! < 2^226, so it's not that big in computer terms. It's smaller than a single AVX2 register, a ChaCha20/AES-256/Curve25519 key, a pair of IPv6 addresses, etc. Still mindbogglingly huge, but not uncommonly large.
The whole premise of computers being unable to do shuffling as good as humans is ridiculous. 52! is huge but log(52!) is not.
If anything it's humans (unless specifically trained) who produce horribly biased shuffles. Whole chunks of sequences from the previous deal can show up, either directly or spaced 2x or 4x. Try ordering a deck first, then shuffle it, then open each card and see if you notice any patterns.
RDRAND has a throughput of hundreds of megabytes per second on most processors. Getting 226 bits is pretty easy, even shuffling millions of decks per second you'd be bottlenecked elsewhere.
(That does sound like a fun optimization challenge: "write a program to fairly shuffle the most decks of cards per second possible.")
Quantum random number generators are commercially available, relatively inexpensive and can supply hundreds of megabits per second of truly random data from a single PCIe card.
Sure, it's a big number, but nobody was ever approaching the problem of generating a randomly shuffled deck by generating all 52! possibilities and choosing one of them.
> Card dealers create a unique deck with each shuffle, something computers cannot replicate
This is entirely, unequivocally false.
Shuffling as an algorithm to implement is easy to fuck up, but if you use a good one and a true RNG source, computers can shuffle better than humans - just as randomly, and many orders of magnitude faster.
> an algorithm would randomly select an arrangement from the 52! possible decks. But no computer has enough memory to evaluate all of these possibilities
It sounds more like they don't understand how a computer can shuffle something.
Those human imperfections likely decrease randomness - for example leaving cards that started adjacent more likely to remain adjacent han by strict chance.
Really? It repeats a point from the article, and in so doing utterly misses the point of the comment it's replying to. Fisher-Yates is at least not broken, but it can only be as good as the underlying RNG.
> I wouldn't be surprised if it's being used for the shuffle.
That would certainly be a good thing to check before using Go's shuffle for real-money poker games. I wouldn't take it for granted.
> Also, I'm keen to see what shuffle algorithms you know of that aren't susceptible to RNG issues
There are not and cannot be any such algorithms. That's the entire point of this thread. Fisher-Yates is necessary but not sufficient. You either have sufficient random bits for your shuffle or not.
1. Every remotely competent language has a secure (P)RNG and is using it to Fisher-Yates shuffle. Go is not special in this regard.
2. Nobody in this thread is criticizing Fisher-Yates, because in all likelihood all of us are using Fisher-Yates. We're discussing the failure of the algorithm used in the article.
3. Please take the time to read and understand the posts you respond to before you respond to them.
In case anyone is following along, the hostility the above poster is demonstrating is because there isn't any shuffling algorithm that isn't susceptible to the RNG issue, and he didn't think about the cryptographically secure RNGs in use today.
My friend, I am not hostile. I'm merely pointing out that you have not understood a single post you've responded to. Including the one you responded to just now.
The following algorithm is not susceptible to RNG issues (in Rust, since I've been playing around with it):
fn shuffle(vec: &Vec) -> () {
}
And I'm sure since you're reading all these posts so carefully you'll totally understand why this is both a joke and a proof that you don't know what you're talking about.
As a sort of TL;DR: it's basically like selection sort but instead of selecting the sort-compliant choice among the remaining ones, you ask the RNG and pick a random one.
There’s an almost mystical belief among certain tech and science journalists that computers are bad at randomness, and it’s really bizarre, and in my opinion, pretty harmful.
I've run TRNG's to create truly random numbers that can be audited and certified by the NSF. Hardware like HSM's and TPM's were convenient sources. I just have to wait until a Big Tech gatekeeper propagates this method. Who knows? Maybe even the temperature parameter in language models could find some value in it.
The original Fisher–Yates shuffle was published in 1938 by Ronald Fisher and Frank Yates in their book Statistical tables for biological, agricultural and medical research.
The modern version of the Fisher–Yates shuffle, designed for computer use, was introduced by Richard Durstenfeld in 1964. It is also known as the Knuth shuffle after Donald Knuth who popularized it in Volume Two of The Art of Computer Programming (1969)
RDRAND and RDSEED are both using quantum principles (aka: heat and temperature / truly quantumly random noise at the microscopic level in the CPU's transistors) to generate random numbers.
Well... a seed at least. And then they are expanded using AES encryption IIRC (which "shouldn't" be breakable, and even if it were breakable it'd probably be very difficult to follow). I think RDSEED takes hundreds (or nearly a thousand) cycles to complete, but we're still talking millions-of-bits of entropy per second. More than enough to shuffle a deck even if you're taking a fresh RDSEED every single card.
Every few months, it feels like "someone effed up RNG" becomes an article. But in practice, RDRAND / RDSEED are the primitives you need. And you should be getting that for free with Linux's /dev/urandom on modern platforms.
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I think RDSEED / RDRAND cannot be "proven secure" because of all the VMs we are running in practice though. So its something you need to be running on physical hardware to be 100% sure of security. So its still harder than it looks.
But its not "impossible" or anything. Just work to cover all the little issues that could go wrong. After all, these RDRAND/RDSEED instructions were created so that we can send our credit card numbers securely across the internet. They're solid because they _HAVE_ to be solid. And if anyone figures out a problem with these instructions, virtually everyone in the cryptographic community will be notified of it immediately.
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EDIT: I should probably add that using the shot-noise found in a pn-junction (be it a diode or npn transistor) is a fun student-level EE project if anyone wants to actually play with the principles here.
You are basically applying an amplifier of some kind (be it 3x inverters, or an OpAmp, or another NPN transistor) to a known quantum-source of noise. Reverse-avalanche noise from a Zener Diode is often chosen but there's many, many sources of true white-noise that you could amplify.
When you can modify the microcode of a CPU, you can modify the behaviour of the RDRAND/RDSEED instructions. For example, using EntrySign [1] on AMD, you can make RDRAND to always return 4 (chosen by a fair dice roll, guaranteed to be random)
[1] https://bughunters.google.com/blog/5424842357473280/zen-and-...
I don't mean to say that RDSEED is sufficient for security. But a "correctly implemented and properly secured" RDSEED is indeed, quantum random.
IE: While not "all" RDSEED implementations (ie: microcode vulnerabilities, virtual machine emulation, etc. etc.) are correct... it is possible to build a true RNG for cryptographic-level security with "correct" RDSEED implementations.
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This is an important factoid because a lot of people still think you need geiger counters and/or crazy radio antenna to find sufficient sources of true entropy. Nope!! The easiest source of true quantum entropy is heat, and that's inside of every chip. A good implementation can tap into that heat and provide perfect randomness.
Just yeah: microcode vulnerabilities, VM vulnerabilities, etc. etc. There's a whole line of other stuff you also need to keep secure. But those are "Tractable" problems and within the skills of a typical IT Team / Programming team. The overall correct strategy is that... I guess "pn-junction shot noise" is a sufficient source of randomness. And that exists in every single transistor of your ~billion transistor chips/CPUs. You do need to build out the correct amplifiers to see this noise but that's called RDSEED in practice.
What I’m impressed by is getting noise of a consistent level out of a circuit. That’s a nice second layer of difficulty to the “make some noise” EE project.
I think the noise has to be random... so its inherently inconsistent ;) .. maybe?
Its easy to think if you can see it in both frequency and time domains.
So the fourier-transform of white noise is still.... white noise. Random is random as you say. But this has implications. That means the "wattage" of noise (ie: Voltage * Current == Watts aka its power) is a somewhat predictable value. If you have 0.5 Watts of noise, it will be 0.5 Watts of noise in the frequency-domain (after a fourier transform, across all frequencies).
The hard part of amplification is keeping it consistent across all specifications. I assume the previous post was talking about keeping white noise (which is "flat" across all frequency domains), truly flat. IE: It means your OpAmps (or whatever other amplifer you use) CANNOT distort the value.
Which is still student level (you cannot be a good EE / Analog engineer if you're carelessly introducing distortions). Any distortion of white-noise is easily seen because your noise profile weakens over frequency (or strengthens over frequency), rather than being consistent.
But most common noises are not white. you had to decolor it before.
Alternatively, you can choose a proven source of white noise.
Such as the reverse-bias shot and/or avalanche noise at the pn junction of a reverse bias'ed Zener Diode. Which is white-noise into the hundreds-of-MHz. Maybe not good enough for RDSEED, but certainly good enough and fast-enough for most hobbyist projects who are experimenting with this for the first time.
These are methods to generate cryptographically secure pseudo random numbers using a truly random seed.
RDSEED returns a truly random seed (as long as you aren't getting hacked while running in a VM or something)
RDRAND is allowed to stretch the true random seed a little bit inside of hardware, which is sufficient for most purposes.
Link to the discoverers of the problem: https://web.archive.org/web/20140104095330/http:/www.cigital...
It actually has some depth into the multiple problems of the algorithm published by the gaming company.
One thing that I wonder about is that even with Fisher-Yates, a PRNG relies on a seed value. Assuming that this seed is going to be a 64-bit value, that seed value can only go up to a maximum of 2^64-1 = 18,446,744,073,709,551,615.000, which is still less than 52!.
I know that modern operating systems use an entropy pool. Does this mean that the PRNG is re-seeded for every random number generated, thus making this a non-issue? Or does it just take from this entropy pool once?
No cryptographically secure PRNG has a 64-bit state. If you are not using a CSRNG in an adversarial environment, you have bigger problems.
When I did it back in the day for a poker site we also had the constraint of never storing the positions of shuffled cards for security reasons. We always sorted the deck and when it came to dealing I developed a shuffle server that got noise from a taped up webcams cmos sensor, when a player needed a card it polled the server which was just outputting random positions from 0 to 51 continuously, if the card position was already dealt, it re requested a new one, entropy was gotten from player decision time and network speed. It was a fun thing to build.
Online poker died because having 1 other person at the table sharing cards surreptitiously drastically increases the odds in your favor, which ruins cash games. Let alone AI which has mostly solved the game if you have a bot making your decisions.
Poker must be played in person, otherwise it’s a dead game
None of this is wrong, but anecdotally, I will say that there are still human beings playing poker online, and a better human being can still win in the long run. (Though, live poker is much more fun)
> Today many online poker sites use the Fisher–Yates algorithm, also called the Knuth shuffle (which sounds delightfully like a dance). It’s easy to implement and delivers satisfactory results.
Assuming CSPRNG and fisher yates, why is it only "satisfactory"...? What's better...?
Satsifactory in this context is good, not bad.
We live in a euphemistic world where "satisfactory" is presented to failures to not hurt their feelings, but the word also and originally means it's good enough, i.e. delivers an unbiased shuffle.
But it's not just good enough, it's optimal. It is equivalent to picking a random deck from the set of all possible decks assuming your random source is good. More random than a real shuffle.
Right and that’s what satisfactory means, the condition was satisfied.
Why not just simulate a real shuffle?
Just "cut" in a random location (rotate the deck a random amount), then split the deck roughly in half (add a bit of random variation), then "flip them together" back to front by alternately taking 1 or 2 (randomly, add a small chance of 3, so maybe 50% 1, 40% 2 and 10% 3) from each side till there are no cards left to shuffle. Then repeat 8 times or so (there's a certain minimum number of times that ensures good randomness)
You can:
(a) Use Fischer-Yates, which is fast and, if correctly implemented, unbiased, or
(b) Come up with an ad-hoc scheme like this, do some fancy math to bound its total variation distance (or, worse, some weaker concept of distance), convince yourself that the distance to the uniform distribution is acceptable, and end up with a slower algorithm when you’re done.
The artice links to the paper which discusses the issue. The paper identifies two problems: a biased swapping algorithm, and a PRNG with easy-to-guess state.
For the first problem, a very simple "for each card, pick a number between 1 and 52 and swap the card with that number (or do nothing if it's the same card)" is proposed to eliminate bias. This seems pretty simple to verify.
For the second problem, there is no workaround except to use a better RNG.
So in the context of the paper, the reason your algorithm wouldn't have worked is because the programmers seeded their PRNG with the time of day. In the context of shuffling more generally, I don't know but it seems that there are even simpler algorithms.
That paper: https://web.archive.org/web/20140104095330/http:/www.cigital...
> Why not just simulate a real shuffle?
If you are asking why your proposed shuffling method is insecure: I don't know, and that's why I would never use that.
Asking "why not do X?" is entirely not paranoid enough for security. If you want to propose an algorithm, start with trying to prove the security claims of the algorithm. In this case, you'd need to prove that your algorithm creates a permutation that is indistinguishable from random. If you can't prove it, it's highly probable that your algorithm doesn't create a random permutation and someone will figure out how to break it.
I'll point out that we already have proven shuffling algorithms[1] and they're obviously faster than what you've proposed. So the simple answer to your question is "Because it's unproven and slower than proven algorithms."
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher%E2%80%93Yates_shuffle
From what I understand, the quality of the randomness of Fisher-Yates depends entirely on the quality of the random source AND that you didn't bias it by using modulo with a non-evenly-dividing divisor. It actually says that right in the article.
My method may not suffer as much from those drawbacks, but you're right, without testing it thoroughly, there's no way to know and it should not be relied upon instead of F-Y.
EDIT: My intuition was correct more or less. Doing it the way I described serves to "smear" any bias across the deck. Fascinating chatgpt convo on it: https://chatgpt.com/share/68bd103f-9188-8004-8cbc-86693a0d87...
Turns out that an even easier way is just to assign 128 bits of randomness to each card and sort them by that. Degrades gracefully from biased sources, apparently.
> Turns out that an even easier way is just to assign 128 bits of randomness
52! is roughly 2^226.
You cannot address all 2^226 positions with a 2^128 address generated from 2^64 seed.
it's 128 bits per card. That's vastly more than 226 bits.
You could use something like 12 bits of randomness per card (a very rough approximation of the log_2(n^2)) to get the probability that you reuse a number down to a manageable level, check if you’ve reused a number (which is basically free once you’ve sorted), and then repeat the whole process if you reused a number.
Or you could have a lazily calculated infinite precision random number per card and use more like 6 bits per card on expectation. Other than using more (and annoyingly variable) memory, this may well be faster than a properly unbiased Fisher-Yates.
Or you could assign a few bits per card, sort, and then recurse on each group of cards that sorted into the same bucket.
In summary, there are lots of genuinely unbiased solutions (assuming a perfect binary RNG), and they all boil down to something roughly equivalent to rejection sampling.
With all due respect, I don't think you understand. The 128 bits are just to sort the 52 cards into a random-enough order, and they have sufficient entropy and space for that.
We're not interested in sorting all possible decks, just all possible cards (52) into 1 unique randomized deck. The more bits we assign to these, the more any error or bias in the source goes to nil. (In contrast, consider the use of only 4 bits.)
Since everyone's bashing my use of ChatGPT, I don't think ChatGPT5 would have made that categorical error.
2^128*52 is 6656 bits, or 30x more than 2^226, so it will work IF those bits are independent. If CSPRNG is used, such as AES128, it will use 2^128 seed, which is not enough to cover all 2^226 permutations. If PRNG sequence is reused to generate more shuffles, then the next shuffle can be predicted from the previous one.
CSPRNG AES256 with 2^256 random seed is safe.
CSPRNG AES128 with 2^128 (or less) random seed is not safe.
> If PRNG sequence is reused to generate more shuffles, then the next shuffle can be predicted from the previous one.
That's theoretically true by a counting argument, but for a CSPRNG the only way to compute that next shuffle costs about as much computationally as brute force. 128 bits is enough to make that infeasible, though 256 may be preferable for the usual abundance of caution.
The number of permutations doesn't matter here, since an attack becomes computationally infeasible before it becomes counting infeasible. It's also possible for a practical attack to exist even when the output can't be predicted exactly, since statistical information is still valuable.
> From what I understand, the quality of the randomness of Fisher-Yates depends entirely on the quality of the random source AND that you didn't bias it by using modulo with a non-evenly-dividing divisor. It actually says that right in the article.
Yes.
Pretty much every modern language ships with a secure PRNG (which probably just calls /dev/urandom). A poker site probably has enough throughput to want to not block while waiting for /dev/urandom to build up entropy, so they might do something faster, but /dev/urandom is probably secure, it just might be a slower than a big poker site needs.
The non-evenly-diving divisor thing is a bit trickier, which is why standard libraries implement Fisher-Yates for you. But the solution is basically:
Using your PRNG, generate the number of bits you need. So if you need a number 0-51, generate 6 bits. 6 bits can hold 0-63. If you get a number in the range 52-63, discard that and generate a new 6-bit number with the PRNG.
If you need a number in an awkward range like 0-35, you'll need to discard a lot of numbers, but keep in mind this may still be faster than modular division which is pretty dang slow.
> My method may not suffer as much from those drawbacks, but you're right, without testing it thoroughly, there's no way to know and it should not be relied upon instead of F-Y.
That's very much not what I said.
"Testing it thoroughly" is not adequate. Start by proving the algorithm is correct. If you don't have a proof the algorithm works there's no reason to even start implementing it so there's nothing to test.
> EDIT: My intuition was correct more or less. Doing it the way I described serves to "smear" any bias across the deck. Fascinating chatgpt convo on it: https://chatgpt.com/share/68bd103f-9188-8004-8cbc-86693a0d87...
Jesus Christ, no. If you still believe anything ChatGPT says then security is not the field for you.
And if you believe nothing ChatGPT says then you simply suffer from the opposite bias. The dilemma is that it is mostly right, most of the time, isn't it? Almost like... people? I mean, one person responded with an error that ChatGPT almost certainly wouldn't have made: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45158430
If ChatGPT says things that are empirically provable, then it's not wrong, is it?
"Mostly right" is the most insidious option, because the frequent true statements or implications will lull you into believing the infrequent false ones.
For Fisher-Yates, if the RNG is good then the output permutation is independent of the input permutation. That's not true for your proposed algorithm, and neither you nor the the LLM has analyzed to determine how quickly the sensitivity to the input permutation decays. That sensitivity will have complicated structure, so it's a nontrivial problem in cryptanalysis.
The problem where the low bits of old, not cryptographically secure PRNGs were particularly non-random is real. That would be a problem for any algorithm using it though--imagine if your riffle took rand() % 2. The resolution (use the high bits, not the low bits) is the same for any algorithm. It's possible that your proposed algorithm is less sensitive because the much greater number of RNG calls makes it somehow average out, but neither you nor the LLM has analyzed that, because the residual structure is again a cryptanalysis problem.
Any potentially adversarial application should use a CSPRNG, moving the cryptographic security into that existing, well-studied block. So the problem you're trying to solve doesn't exist in practice. The LLM can probably be prompted to tell you that; but since you stated that the new shuffling algorithm was your idea, it worked to find reasons it was a good one. I don't think this is a good use of LLMs, but if you're going to then you have to avoid any suggestion that the new idea is yours, to avoid triggering the sycophancy.
Lol, I laughed at his confident usage of "turns out" and "apparently" after his conclusive conversation with his chatgpt expert..
I never claimed conclusivity; words like "apparently" were supposed to suggest that, which is why I didn't use "obviously," "definitely" or "conclusively".
Also, maybe be less of an asshole next time. People are allowed to be wrong, that is the whole point of a discussion, and ridicule is not a counterargument.
/eyeroll
I don't think you're either wrong or right (in fact my intuition sides with yours I think) because I definitely know way less than you about the subject in general, or probably also less than almost anyone here on HN-- just the trust of swaths of people in the authoritativeness of LLM outputs does generally amuse me. I'm sure we'll get there one day, but we're not there yet. I clearly offended you, and I apologize.
“In an ideal world, an algorithm would randomly select an arrangement from the 52! possible decks. But no computer has enough memory to evaluate all of these possibilities, and a perfect random number generator doesn’t yet exist. Therefore, developers generally rely on algorithms that simulate card shuffling.”
You’ve got to be kidding me. What’s wrong with sampling each card independently and uniformly (without replacement)?
If you do it correctly, you've reinvented Fisher-Yates[1]. If you do it wrong, you've reinvented this unnamed, broken algorithm[2], instead.
But the issue in the article isn't application of pseudorandom numbers. It's seeding the generator.
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher%E2%80%93Yates_shuffle [2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher%E2%80%93Yates_shuffle#N...
> In the late 1990s the development platform ASF Software supplied several online poker providers, such as Planet Poker, with card-shuffling algorithms. The platform even posted the algorithm on its website as proof that the game was reliably programmed.
What amazes me is the level of overconfidence the developers of the broken algorithm had to post it online. I mean it's not that the probability theory was a novel and unexplored field at the time.
Not sure "overconfidence" applies as you might be stretching the author's unfounded narrative.
This is more impressive than the alternatives:
1. Security through obscurity.
2. Increased financial liability due to #1.
Imagine you proudly present to the public your obviously flawed version of the algorithm even though the correct version is known for decades. If only you've read a single book on the topic.
If that's not overconfidence then it's hard to find what is.
You're just restating your initial claim and not addressing the issue I raised with the latter.
What is the issue? Not at all clear from your comment. You're saying above it's better than security by obscurity but it's beside the point.
> but it's beside the point
Why is it beside the point?
You haven't established their intent for gross negligence and give no charity to the fact this was 30 years ago (pre-Wikipedia and the search breadth we have today). Since then, people have continued to expose severe RNG design flaws in other systems designed by very smart people. It happens...
30 years ago it wasn't dark ages. Wikipedia didn't exist but books on probability theory and statistics did.
When you do a shuffling algorithm in a sensitive context (money or security), you have prove that it returns all the possible permutations with equal probability plus put lower bounds on the amount of entropy you need from the underlying RNG. If you're unable to prove it, you shouldn't move forward with the algorithm. Any irregularities in the output distribution can be exploited. This is textbook knowledge pioneered in early encryption works and perfected by the time WWII ended. Evidently the effort to prove correctness was never made.
Now the original article can indeed misrepresent or omit important facts. I'm definitely open to reconsider my conclusion if more facts become available. However "there was no Wikipedia" isn't one of them, it doesn't count as an excuse not to do your job properly.
If it turned out, for example, that "ASF Software" wasn't even aware that their shuffling algorithm was used to shuffle cards and just shipped it along with 200 other basic algorithms as a some sort of "better standard library", this would change the situation. However from the quick googling it seems that their product wasn't a standard library, it was specifically software for Texas Hold'em. This is a "you had one job" kind of situation.
> Since then, people have continued to expose severe RNG design flaws in other systems designed by very smart people. It happens...
Absolutely, but we're not talking frontiers of Computer Science here.
* If you seed your RNG with at most 86 million unique values, you get at most 86 million unique random sequences out of it.
* If your code should have M possible equiprobable outcomes, it has N equiprobable outcomes, and N doesn't divide M, you're in trouble.
> 30 years ago it wasn't dark ages...
I didn't say or imply books didn't exist. You can't credibly say it was as readily available, and I promise you that people are still making these mistakes, today.
> When you do a shuffling algorithm in a sensitive context (money or security), you have prove that it returns all the possible...If you're unable to prove it, you shouldn't move forward with the algorithm.
Ideally, of course! This is a really high standard that I'm afraid isn't enforced in a lot of commercial or even sensitive applications. 86 million permutations is probably good enough and even if someone was clever enough to synch clocks and narrow to 200k permutations, then I'm not convinced there was actually any harm.
Do you have any proof of harm?
And there are plenty of smart people in the 90s and beyond not realizing that relying a system clock to seed values is attackable. These guys, to their credit, patched their system by openly providing their algorithms.
Even if their clients had been harmed, they'd published the algorithm so that their "sophisticated" clients could audit the algorithm.
> I'm definitely open to reconsider my conclusion if more facts become available.
This is circular as you're taking the article's narrative at face value without getting any primary sources confirming gross negligence or "arrogance" as you imply.
...They posted their algorithm as a way to prove it was reliable. Someone pointed out it wasn't reliable. They revised the algorithm. What's the problem here?
They were selling this algorithm for money and evidently didn't use any of that money to hire a single statistician to validate it. The mistake they've made isn't obscure and doesn't require a thousand pairs of eyes to catch, just one.
Imagine paying to a professional plumber, he installs the toilet upside down and then posts the photos online for the community to check his work.
I guess this PRNG has recurrence period much less than 52! (or wasn't seeded appropriately), so that only sampled a fraction of the distribution
"... the system ties its number generation to the number of seconds that have passed since midnight, resetting once each day, which further limits the possible random values. Only about 86 million arrangements could be generated this way,"
A lot of problems are pretty hard if you insist on doing zero research
This became a hot discussion issue in magic the gathering online (MTGO). I always felt my shuffles in MTGO felt different somehow than my offline paper shuffles. It's hard to know for sure when its all closed source. I know a lot of people were suspicious though.
MTGA uses a method called ‘smoothing’ for initial hand selection: https://mtgazone.com/mtg-arenas-opening-hand-algorithm-and-s...
I assume MTGO uses something similar and I swear I had a great analytical article bookmarked regarding MTGO shuffles but I can’t find it.
Modo uses FY and fits not smooth draws. Arena only smooths in best of 1 matches.
Closed source doesn't need to stop you - even if a server was dealing out the cards you can still do a randomness test on them once you gather enough deals, but you would probably need millions of hands of data to do the analysis (see: dieharder tests)
Article goes through a mostly irrelevant discussion about "52 factorial is a really really big number" before getting to the computer science meat of the headline:
RNG was seeded with a millisecond time of day, leading to 86.4M possible decks. Oooph.
The number 52! is absurdly large. While the article is behind a paywall and so I can't see its full discussion, I'm reminded of https://czep.net/weblog/52cards.html that has a bit on the "how large is the number"
> Start by picking your favorite spot on the equator. You're going to walk around the world along the equator, but take a very leisurely pace of one step every billion years. The equatorial circumference of the Earth is 40,075,017 meters. Make sure to pack a deck of playing cards, so you can get in a few trillion hands of solitaire between steps. After you complete your round the world trip, remove one drop of water from the Pacific Ocean. Now do the same thing again: walk around the world at one billion years per step, removing one drop of water from the Pacific Ocean each time you circle the globe. The Pacific Ocean contains 707.6 million cubic kilometers of water. Continue until the ocean is empty.
And it goes on.
Numbers like Tree(3) or Loader's number or the various "these are really big mathematical functions" ( relevant xkcd https://xkcd.com/207/ )... we know we can't comprehend them. But 52! - that's something that we think we can get our head around... and it's mind boggling large once you start doing the math and trying to relate it to real things that we can relate to (which are mind bogglingly large).
52! < 2^226, so it's not that big in computer terms. It's smaller than a single AVX2 register, a ChaCha20/AES-256/Curve25519 key, a pair of IPv6 addresses, etc. Still mindbogglingly huge, but not uncommonly large.
Right, but storing 52! distinct values isn’t something a computer is going to be able to do.
Well neither can a human.
The whole premise of computers being unable to do shuffling as good as humans is ridiculous. 52! is huge but log(52!) is not.
If anything it's humans (unless specifically trained) who produce horribly biased shuffles. Whole chunks of sequences from the previous deal can show up, either directly or spaced 2x or 4x. Try ordering a deck first, then shuffle it, then open each card and see if you notice any patterns.
So?
You’re only using one deck at a time; so you only need to generate 1 bit randomly 226 times — then use that deck.
Without a bunch of (unentangled) electrons you can observe, getting 226 truly random bits in quick succession doesn't seem all that easy.
RDRAND has a throughput of hundreds of megabytes per second on most processors. Getting 226 bits is pretty easy, even shuffling millions of decks per second you'd be bottlenecked elsewhere.
(That does sound like a fun optimization challenge: "write a program to fairly shuffle the most decks of cards per second possible.")
Depends on what you mean by "truly random" but if it's "cryptographically secure random" then it's not particularly hard.
There are strong monetary incentives to break all kinds of private keys but most of the time they hold pretty well.
Quantum random number generators are commercially available, relatively inexpensive and can supply hundreds of megabits per second of truly random data from a single PCIe card.
A quantum computer can.
Sure, it's a big number, but nobody was ever approaching the problem of generating a randomly shuffled deck by generating all 52! possibilities and choosing one of them.
It didn't even go into the fact that it got exploited, which it did.
And I don't think it almost brought them down.
No paywall mirror: https://archive.ph/ONQgF
> Card dealers create a unique deck with each shuffle, something computers cannot replicate
This is entirely, unequivocally false.
Shuffling as an algorithm to implement is easy to fuck up, but if you use a good one and a true RNG source, computers can shuffle better than humans - just as randomly, and many orders of magnitude faster.
Maybe they mean that computers can't replicate the imperfections/shortcomings that might define human/hand shuffling? That's kind of how I took it.
Given
> an algorithm would randomly select an arrangement from the 52! possible decks. But no computer has enough memory to evaluate all of these possibilities
It sounds more like they don't understand how a computer can shuffle something.
Those human imperfections likely decrease randomness - for example leaving cards that started adjacent more likely to remain adjacent han by strict chance.
They most definitely decrease randomness.
But I guess the article’s point is that human imperfections offset that with lower correlated failure modes.
I think the RNG source is the point here. It's not as impossible as stated, but you have to put some work in to get a good one.
Do you? Modern CPUs have had built-in TRNGs for years.
Go (and probably other languages) has the Fisher-Yates algorithm for shuffling
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher%E2%80%93Yates_shuffle
It’s comments like this that keep me coming back to HN. I’d never heard of this before.
Really? It repeats a point from the article, and in so doing utterly misses the point of the comment it's replying to. Fisher-Yates is at least not broken, but it can only be as good as the underlying RNG.
Go has a cryptographically secure RNG now, I wouldn't be surprised if it's being used for the shuffle.
Also, I'm keen to see what shuffle algorithms you know of that aren't susceptible to RNG issues
> I wouldn't be surprised if it's being used for the shuffle.
That would certainly be a good thing to check before using Go's shuffle for real-money poker games. I wouldn't take it for granted.
> Also, I'm keen to see what shuffle algorithms you know of that aren't susceptible to RNG issues
There are not and cannot be any such algorithms. That's the entire point of this thread. Fisher-Yates is necessary but not sufficient. You either have sufficient random bits for your shuffle or not.
1. Every remotely competent language has a secure (P)RNG and is using it to Fisher-Yates shuffle. Go is not special in this regard.
2. Nobody in this thread is criticizing Fisher-Yates, because in all likelihood all of us are using Fisher-Yates. We're discussing the failure of the algorithm used in the article.
3. Please take the time to read and understand the posts you respond to before you respond to them.
In case anyone is following along, the hostility the above poster is demonstrating is because there isn't any shuffling algorithm that isn't susceptible to the RNG issue, and he didn't think about the cryptographically secure RNGs in use today.
My friend, I am not hostile. I'm merely pointing out that you have not understood a single post you've responded to. Including the one you responded to just now.
The following algorithm is not susceptible to RNG issues (in Rust, since I've been playing around with it):
And I'm sure since you're reading all these posts so carefully you'll totally understand why this is both a joke and a proof that you don't know what you're talking about.More snark, thus proving the initial assessment.
Python's random.shuffle also uses Fisher-Yates
I wonder how many other languages have it implemented as their shuffle algorithm
As a sort of TL;DR: it's basically like selection sort but instead of selecting the sort-compliant choice among the remaining ones, you ask the RNG and pick a random one.
However, note that using a random function as the comparator for a sort function does not generally result in an unbiased shuffle.
There’s an almost mystical belief among certain tech and science journalists that computers are bad at randomness, and it’s really bizarre, and in my opinion, pretty harmful.
I've run TRNG's to create truly random numbers that can be audited and certified by the NSF. Hardware like HSM's and TPM's were convenient sources. I just have to wait until a Big Tech gatekeeper propagates this method. Who knows? Maybe even the temperature parameter in language models could find some value in it.
Lame clickbait title. TLDR; shuffling algorithm's have improved since the 90s...
Really?
~ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher%E2%80%93Yates_shufflePicking a bad algorithm, as they did here in this example from the 1990's is timeless.
Good shuffle algorithms existed then, and had existed since the 1930s.